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1. The Global Knowledge Divide 
Evidence on the Knowledge Divide I: 
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The Sachs’ View of the World 
 Group 1: The Innovators 
 1 billion people (most OECD) 
 Described by endogenous growth models 
 Group 2: The Diffusers 
 3.5 billion people (China, India, Southern Cone of 
South America, Eastern European EU members) 
 Absorb technology by i) buying capital goods, ii) 
FDI, iii) final consumption of consumer goods 
 Group 3: The (Income and Knowledge) Poor 
 1.5 billion people (Sub-saharan Africa, Andean 
region, Central and South Asia) 
 Almost absolutely excluded 
Why is there a Knowledge Divide? I 
 Knowledge production requires a mix of 
public and private incentives for knowledge 
generation 
 Public support 
 IPRs 
 The mix is important because there is a need 
to balance between dynamic efficiency and 
static efficiency  
 Both private and public actors play roles as 
suppliers and consumers of science, 
technology and innovation in national and 
regional systems of innovation 
Why is there a Knowledge Divide? II 
 Current Incentives and Capacity are Insufficient 
to Produce Knowledge Required by the Poor 
 Limited effectiveness of private incentives (small 
and “thin” markets) 
 Limited resources devoted, in a sustained way, by 
the poor to research and to technological innovation  
(failure of public incentives)  
 Limited contribution of other countries’ research to 
address problems specific to the poor 
 Limited access by the poor to knowledge produced 
in developed countries 
 The result: a highly skewed supply and 
diffusion of innovations that leaves the poor out 
What has the Response Been Like? 
 Since there is no “global government,” little 
public support to global issues and virtually 
none to support the development of knowledge 
relevant exclusively to the poor 
 The global response so far has been mostly 
centered on private incentives to enhance 
dynamic efficiency (e.g. extending intellectual 
property rights through TRIPS) 
 
What has been the rationale? 
 The rehtoric and some of the practice of 
swinging the pendulum from public support to 
private incentives 
 The national interests of rich countries in 
trade negotiations (the political economy of 
international IPRs) 
 The argument that the science and 
technology are “luxuries” and that the poor 
have more pressing issues to deal with 
What is Wrong with the Current 
Response? 
 Inconsistent with national practice in most 
developed countries, and especially the US, 
which have devoted over long periods of time 
substantial public resources to R&D 
 Lack of theoretical and empirical support to the 
assertion that international IP harmonization is 
the best response to avoiding free-riding and 
promoting local innovation 
 Science, technology and innovation have 
proved key in solving both larger and smaller 
development challenges: 
 Green Revolution 
 Ochocersiasis Control 
 Drancunculiasis Control (close to eradication) 
2. The Case of Health 








































 Malaria: more than 1 million deaths 
 TB: close to 2 million deaths 
 HIV/AIDS: more than 3 million deaths 
 1.4 million deaths per year in poor countries from 
childhood diseases readily combated by immunization, 
compared with fewer than 1,000 in developed countries  
Why Health? II 
 Malaria: cuts output in sub-Saharan Africa by 
17% 
 TB: costs about 20% of household income and 
cuts output in sub-Saharan Africa by 4%-7% 
 HIV/AIDS: cuts output in sub-Saharan Africa by 
35% 
 Each less ten years of life expectancy costs 
(after controlling for other factors) 0.3 to 0.4 % 
a year in terms of economic growth:  
 Comparing the average life expectancy of a rich 
with that of a poor country (77 years vs. 49 years) 
the gap in the yearly growth rate is of 1.6% (CMH 
2001: 24)  
Why Health? III 
 Success is possible: 
 Smallpox eradication ($168 billion in benefits from 
1978 to 1998, and counting) 
 Polio almost eradicated (savings of $1.5 billion a 
year) 
 Science, technology and innovation do matter: 
 One of the most R&D intensive sectors, where 
incentives for knowledge generation and diffusion 
are key 
 Knowledge on health conditions has been 
responsible for major improvements in well-being 
over the 20th century 
Why Health? IV 
 Gross asymetries in knowledge generation: 
 $70 billion a year on health R&D by the public and 
private sectors, but only 10% is used for research 
into 90% of the world's problems (“10/90 gap”) 
 of 1 393 new chemical entities marketed between 
1975 and 1999, only 16 were for tropical diseases 
and tuberculosis. There is a 13-fold greater chance 
of a drug being brought to market for central-
nervous-system disorders or cancer than for a 
neglected disease. 
 Highly contentious issue of access by the poor 
to IP protected drugs 
 Deeply suspicious pharmaceutical sector to 
producing drugs and vaccines for the poor 
The Issues 
Knowledge Applicable 
Only In Poor Countries 
Knowledge Applicable Both 





• Malaria control 
 
• Malaria vaccine 
• TB vaccine (effective) 
• HIV/AIDS vaccine (?) 
 
• Childhood vaccines 
• ARVs 
 
• Cancer treatment 
• HIV/AIDS vaccine (?) 
The Challenges 
Knowledge Applicable 
Only In Poor Countries 
Knowledge Applicable Both 





• “Demand” challenges 
 
• No incentives 
• No capacity 
 
• IP-driven prices 
• “Demand” challenges 
 
• Scientific and 
Technical 
• IP-driven prices 
• “Demand” challenges 
 
3. Innovative Financing Options 
Knowledge Relevant for Both  
 IP-Priced Challenges: Thrust of Options is 
Segmentation and Differentiation 
 Knowledge Exists: differential pricing, which 
enhances static efficiency without detracting, in 
the leastest, dynamic efficiency 
 Knowledge does not Exist: differential patenting 
(Lanjouw proposal), allowing for IP protection for 
either the poor or the other countries, not both, 
through a foreign filing license 
 Problems: 
 Ensuring segmentation 
 Political acceptance of segmentation by those not poor 
 Demand Challenges: Create Reliable and 
Stable Demand 
 GAVI, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
 “Clinton deal” 
Knowledge Relevant for the Poor Only  
 Knowledge Exists, then mostly Demand 
Challenges: Reliable and Stable Demand 
 GAVI, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
 Global TB Drug Facility 
 Knowledge does not Exist: 
 Prizes 
 Research contests 
 Patent buyouts 
 Purchase commitments 
 Tax credits 
  on R&D directed to the conditions of the poor 
 on sales of pharmaceuticals for the poor 
 Extending “Orphan Drug Legislation” 
 Patent extensions on existing pharmaceuticals 
 Direct funding to R&D 
Prizes  
 General Characteristics: 
 Sponsor pays an award to the innovator 
 Sponsor only has to pay if there is innovation 
 Sponsor defines how the innovation is used 
 E.g.: sterilization, canned food, measurement of 
longitude, aviation, science 
 Variants: 
 Sponsor specifies objective (e.g. X prize); 
 Sponsor organizes research contest (e.g. US DOD); 
 Patent buy-outs (sponsor pays ex-post); 
 Purchase commitments for vaccines of the poor 
(Kremer): 
 Encourages innovation and diffusion 
Tax Credits  
 On R&D: 
 Pharmaceutical companies can get credits for R&D 
on conditions of the poor; 
 Difficult to monitor, no guarantee of innovation; 
 On Sales: 
 Pharmaceutical companies can get credits for sales 
of pharmaceutical products to the poor 
 Stronger innovation incentive; 
 Also an incentive for diffusion; 
 Examples include the Kerry-Frist proposal in the 
US Senate and the Gordon Brown suggestion 
 
Orphan Drug Legislation  
 It exists nationally: “Orphan diseases” in the US, 
EU and Japan get special incentives: 
 In the US, up to 7 years of market exclusivity; 
 Grants for R&D and clinical trials; 
 Accelerated review in clinical trials; 
 Special tax treatment of sales; 
 Patent or Market Exclusivity Roaming: 
 Patent extensions on existing pharmaceuticals; 
 Market exclusivity; 
 Exists for pediatric pharmaceuticals in the US; 
 Extend “orphan status” to the international level, 
and consider especially the possibility of patent 
or exclusivity roaming 
 
Direct Funding to R&D  
 Mostly through Public/Private Partnerships: 
 Medicines for Malaria Venture; 
 Global Alliance for TB Drug Development; 
 International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI); 
 Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi); 
 Gates Foundation “Grand Challenges on Global 
Health” 
 Proposals to create a Global Health R&D Fund 
 Proposals to create a Manhattan Project for the 
development of a HIV/AIDS vaccine 
4. Discussion: What is Needed and 
What is Feasible? 
Points to reflect upon 
 What can be generalized beyond health? E.g., agricultural 
R&D, where prizes have also been proposed? Other? 
 Is there one “silver bullet”? Would many proposals entail 
dispersion and waist? What criteria would tell us what the 
best options are? 
 Or should we invest in enriching the institutional ecology of 
incentives with many different initiatives? 
 Isn’t the linear model of innovation behind much of 
reasoning providing rationales for the specific financing 
options? 
 What steps to take in order to consider a “global system of 
innovation” that does not leave the poor out? 
 How far should we extend our imagination in designing 
new incentives and institutions (e.g. open source/access 
models; international R&D treaties; liability rules). 
 Are we forgetting science? 
